



Evaluating the Impact of Israeli Farm Settlements on Sustainable Development in Eastern Nigeria, 1961-1970

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Abstract

This study evaluates the Israeli farm settlements established in Eastern Nigeria between 1961 and 1970, a collaborative development initiative aimed at modernizing agriculture and improving food security. The study examines the objectives, implementation, and outcomes of these settlements, modeled after Israel's "kibbutzim" and "moshavim", which introduced advanced farming techniques, training, and cooperative models to local farmers. The research reveals that while the settlements achieved notable successes in boosting crop yields, diversifying agriculture, and training Nigerian farmers in modern practices, their impact was constrained by challenges in adapting Israeli methods to Nigeria's tropical environment, land-use conflicts, and political instability. The Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) disrupted projects, leading to their eventual abandonment. Key findings highlight the settlements' contribution to agricultural innovation and community development, albeit with limited sustainability and scalability. The study underscores the complexities of transplanting agricultural models across contexts and emphasizes the need for context-specific, community-driven approaches in international development cooperation. The legacy of these settlements informs contemporary discussions on agricultural development, partnerships, and resilience in fragile regions. This research contributes to understanding the dynamics of foreign aid, agricultural transformation, and post-colonial development in Africa.

Keywords: Israeli farm settlements, Eastern Nigeria, Moshav model, Agricultural modernization, Nigerian Civil War

Introduction

Agriculture has long been recognized as a key driver of economic growth in Nigeria, providing employment, food security, and foreign exchange. Since attainment of political independence in 1960, various agricultural policies have been introduced by successive governments to revitalize the sector and engender sustainable development in the country. One of such policies was the establishment of Israeli farm settlements in the then eastern region of Nigeria in 1961, by the eastern regional government, under the premiership of Michael Okpara (Udo, 1970).



At independence on 1st October 1960, Nigeria was under regionalism, which was officially introduced in Nigeria by the Richards' Constitution of 1946. The colonial constitution established under Governor Sir Arthur Richards, divided the country into three distinct administrative regions: the Northern, Western, and Eastern regions. The 1946 constitution sought to accommodate Nigeria's diverse ethnic and cultural groups by decentralizing the administration from a centralized system. While introduced in 1946, the structure was further strengthened by the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, which established a true federal system and regionalized the civil service (Adigwe, 1995). Michael Okpara became the Premier of the Eastern Region on October 1, 1959. He succeeded Nnamdi Azikiwe, who resigned the position to contest the federal elections and eventually became Nigeria's first indigenous Governor-General. Okpara was a strong advocate for agricultural reform, believing it was the key to Nigeria's economic success. It was in furtherance of this objective that, the Eastern Nigeria's regional government, under the Premiership of Michael Okpara, sought to transform the region's economy through a bold agricultural initiative inspired by the Israeli "moshav model" (Cooperative Smallholder System). The Eastern region of Nigeria, with its fertile land and dense population, became a focal point for ambitious agricultural modernization efforts, which was designed to address unemployment, modernize farming, and foster sustainable rural development.

The agreement that led to the establishment of Israeli-modelled farm settlements in Eastern Nigeria was initiated following an economic mission to Israel by the Premier of the Eastern Region, Michael Okpara, in 1961. The mission, which began on June 20, 1961, was designed to study Israel's moshav (cooperative smallholder) system to solve food insecurity and rural unemployment in Nigeria. Israel, having itself undergone significant agricultural transformation, offered technical expertise and resources to support Nigeria's development goals through its international cooperation programme (Smock, 1965). The Israeli farm settlements were envisioned as catalysts for rural development, introducing advanced farming techniques, cooperative models, and modern agricultural practices to local communities. During the mission to Israel, the eastern region premier Michael Okpara and his team toured Israeli agricultural settlements, vocational schools, and development projects. He was accompanied by his Minister of Economic Planning, G.E. Okeke. During this visit, it was agreed that Israel would provide technical assistance for the planning and implementation of these settlements. The settlements were based on the Israeli moshav (smallholder village) system, where settlers held secure titles to their land as part of a larger cooperative.

The mission inspired the Eastern Nigeria Farm Settlement Scheme, which adopted the "smallholder village" structure where farmers held secure land titles within a larger cooperative framework. The core objectives were; Transitioning the region's economy from traditional farming to a modern, mechanized system using Israeli technical assistance. Providing gainful employment for secondary school leavers to stem the tide of rural-urban drifts in search of work. Organizing farmers effectively to produce staple food crops (like rice) and protein (poultry) on a large scale to feed the growing population. Establishing a system where pioneer workers were sent to Israel for up to two years of specialized training in crop production and food security. Upon his return from his agricultural mission to Israel, the Israeli "Moshav" farm settlement model, which emphasized cooperative farming, social unity, and economic independence was adopted by Michael Okpara, as part of his agricultural development strategy for eastern Nigeria. This was premised on the fact that premier Michael Okpara was a strong advocate of what he called "pragmatic socialism" and believed that agricultural reform was crucial to the ultimate success of Nigeria.



Implementation of the Farm Settlements

Upon his return from the economic mission to Israel in 1961, Okpara embarked on strategic and practical implementation of the project which initially cost approximately £500,000 per settlement. The premier used the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation (ENDC) as the "engine room" to implement these plans (Floyd, 1969).

In 1961, a team of experts from the Israeli ministry of agriculture and the ministry of foreign affairs was dispatched to Nigeria. The team was led by Gideon Naor. The team typically included experts from varying agricultural background to cover the various facets of the Moshav model (Smock, 1965). Among the agricultural experts in the team were; Agricultural Economists with specialty in assessing potential economic returns and planning the financial structure of the settlements. Irrigation and Water Engineers who were crucial for planning the year-round cultivation required by the modernized system. Cooperative Management Experts were also in the team. They were tasked with training Nigerian settlers on the organizational and social aspects of the cooperative village. The Israeli team of experts also included Extension Officers. They provided on-the-ground technical training to the pioneer workers who were being groomed as the future leaders of the settlements. Similarly, dozens of Nigerian agricultural officers were equally sent to Israel for specialized training before returning to manage the settlements alongside their Israeli counterparts (Nwulu, 2019).

In October 1961, the Eastern Nigeria regional government working in tandem with the Israeli agricultural team of experts, established seven farm settlements across eastern Nigeria. The settlements were equipped with modern facilities, including irrigation systems, schools, maternity homes, and access to extension services. Israeli experts provided technical assistance to the farm settlements, teaching Nigerian farmers modern agricultural practices and helping to establish the settlements. The farm settlements were key pillars of the Eastern Nigeria agricultural revolution in the 1960s. Each was designed to specialize in specific cash crops suited to their unique local climates and soil types.

Locations of the Pioneer Seven Farm Settlements

The Farm settlements were located across the entire eastern region of Nigeria. The idea was to give every part of the region a sense of belonging and stem the tide of marginalization. They included: Igbariam, Ohaji, Erei, Boki, Ulonna South, Ulonna North and Uzouwani farm settlements (ENDC, 1970). Igbariam Farm Settlement was among the seven pioneer farm settlements to be established. The settlement was allocated 6,560 acres of land donated by the surrounding villages of Igbariam, Nando, and Akwuzu. The Igbariam settlement, modeled after the Israeli Moshav system, was a diverse hub for both tree crops and food staples. Oil Palm and Rubber were the dominant plantation crops. Because of its fertile arable land, it also produced high volumes of yam, cassava, maize, and rice. The Igbariam settlement employed hundreds of people who were mostly young school leavers, serving as a model for other settlements in the region. It was considered the most advanced by mid-1965. Similarly, the Ohaji farm settlement covered a total of 61,775 acres. Located in the Ohaji/Egbema area, this settlement was primarily dedicated to large-scale oil palm cultivation. The Ohaji farm settlement was very successful in the early years of its operation. Erei Farm Settlement was also established following the pattern of the Israeli system, with the avowed aim of promoting agricultural development. The Erei farm settlement had a total of 4,500 hectares with speciality in oil palm and rubber plantation agriculture. Boki farm settlement established in 1962, originally covered an expanse of 4,618 hectares and was located primarily in Borum community. Boki farm



was dedicated to oil palm, cocoa and rubber plantations. Additionally, the fertile soil of the rainforest belt also supported a high volume of staple food crops for both local consumption and trade (Isiani, 2020).

Ulonna North farm settlement covered approximately 2,428 hectares, specifically spanning parts of Umuahia and Isuikwuato. They were named using an acronym of the six host communities: Umuobiala, Lodu, Ofeme, Nunya, Nkpa, and Afugiri. Ulonna South farm settlement also had approximately 1,618 hectares. The entire Ulonna plantation complex covers roughly 4,046 hectares. Ulonna north and Ulonna south farm settlements were dedicated primarily for the cultivation of oil palm, rubber and cocoa plantations. Arable crops were also planted to boost food production. The Uzouwani farm settlement was established in 1962 when the Government of Eastern Nigeria acquired two parcels of approximately 500 hectares each at Omasi and Adani to kickstart the scheme. Specifically located in Adani, the Uzouwani settlement was designed for massive rice production. The settlement engaged in extensive irrigation projects to support year-round cultivation. In addition to rice, the settlement also produced significant quantities of cassava, yam, and soybeans for local consumption.

Recruitment of Settlers and Operations of the Farms

The recruitment of farmers for the Eastern Nigeria farm settlements was a rigorous, multi-stage process. The government wanted to ensure that these participants (referred to as settlers) were not just laborers, but modern agricultural entrepreneurs. In furtherance of this objective, the Ministry of Agriculture set strict requirements to filter for the most capable candidates, which were usually between 18 and 30 years old. The minimum educational qualification for candidates was the possession of a Standard VI certificate (primary school graduation). Literacy was essential for following modern technical instructions. Priority was given to those from farming families or those with an expressed interest in rural life.

To ensure that every part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria was carried along in the programme, a quota system was applied in the recruitment process. Roughly 50% of settlers were recruited from the immediate host communities, while the other 50% came from other parts of the region to promote integration. Selection and Interviewing process was decentralized to the provincial and local levels.

Interested young men were instructed to apply through their local District Officers or Agricultural Offices. Candidates underwent physical fitness tests and oral interviews to assess their motivation. A formal board reviewed applications to ensure the ethnic and geographical quotas were met. Selected candidates were made to undergo compulsory training. They were not sent directly to the settlements. Instead, they were required to undergo a two-year training programme at one of the regional Farm Institutes such as; Igbariam, Bawuru, or Achi. During the training period, they were taught the "Israeli Moshav" philosophy—cooperative living combined with individual farm management. Candidates were also trained in practical agricultural skills. Training included mechanized farming, animal husbandry, and modern irrigation. During this period, the government provided a small allowance and housing (ENDC Report, 1970).

After graduating from the institute, the trainees were moved to the actual farm settlements. They were assigned a house and a specific acreage (the "Holding"). Settlers were on probation for several years. If a settler was lazy, failed to maintain his crops, or abandoned the farm, he could be evicted and replaced by a candidate from a waiting list.



To attract educated youth who would otherwise move to cities, the government offered credit facilities, social amenities and ownership. For example, Long-term, low-interest loans for tools and seedlings were made available to settlers. Amenities rarely found in villages at the time, such as, modern housing, schools, and clinics were provided for settlers in the seven farm settlements. Additionally, the settlers were promised that after 25–30 years of successful farming and loan repayment, the settler would own the land and the houses (Udo, 1970).

By 1966, the Government of Eastern Nigeria had successfully recruited and established 1,070 settlers across its flagship farm settlements. While the ambitious long-term plans aimed to accommodate thousands more, the initial phases focused on these pioneers who had completed their rigorous training. Each recruited settler was assigned an individual holding of roughly 12 to 14 acres (approx. 5 hectares) for cash crops, plus 3 acres of "compound land" for their family's food needs (ENDC Reports, 1970)

The government's master plan, developed in collaboration with Israeli experts, envisioned each settlement eventually hosting roughly 720 families (divided into six villages of 120 units each).

The original 1,070 settlers recruited for the Eastern Nigeria farm settlements were promised a unique path to middle-class status, designed around the Israeli Moshav model. Unlike standard government laborers, these settlers were legally defined as "owner-operators" in training. The cornerstone of the recruitment was the promise of secure land title. The farm Settlers entered into a contract for roughly 35 years, the estimated duration of an active working life. Initially, the settlers were "tenants-at-will" to the eastern regional government. However, the agreement stated that after 25 to 35 years, once they had repaid the loans for their house and farm establishment, the ownership of the holding would be transferred to them. Under the arrangement, the rights were specifically designed to allow one child (usually a son) to inherit the holding, assets, and liabilities upon the settler's death, ensuring the farm remained a family legacy (Smock, 1965).

While there was no formal civil service pension, the "pension" was intended to be the residual value of the plantation itself. By the time a settler reached retirement age, they were expected to own a fully mature, high-yielding 12–14-acre plantation of oil palm, rubber, or cocoa. The ongoing income from these "cash cows" served as their retirement fund. Settlers were required to belong to a Farm Settlement Co-operative Society (Floyd, 1969). These societies managed the wholesale marketing of produce and were intended to provide social security and emergency credit for members. The government provided significant initial capital, which was treated as a long-term loan to the settler. Each settler was given a modern house in a "model village" with schools and maternity clinics. For the first two years, settlers received a daily allowance of 3 shillings to sustain themselves while their crops matured. Access to communal processing mills and heavy machinery was guaranteed. Each recruited settler was assigned an individual holding of roughly 12 to 14 acres (approx. 5 hectares) for cash crops, plus 3 acres of "compound land" for their family's food needs (Eastern Nigeria Economic Mission Reports, 1961).

The Successes and Failures of Israeli Farm Settlements in Eastern Nigeria, 1961-1970.

The Eastern Nigeria Farm Settlement Scheme, launched in 1961 under the leadership of Premier Dr. Michael Okpara, stands as one of the most ambitious and intellectually rigorous agricultural experiments in post-colonial African history. The Israeli farm settlements were a unique experiment in international cooperation and agricultural development. The project introduced modern farming



techniques, improve crop yields, and promote community development in a region with fertile land and a growing population.

The scheme successfully modernized the agrarian landscape of the Bight of Biafra hinterlands. While the Nigerian Civil War eventually truncated its progress, the period between 1962 and 1967 showcased a series of profound successes that redefined the relationship between the state, the youth, and the soil (ENDC Reports, 1970).

The Israeli settlement model had a significant impact on Eastern Nigeria's agricultural development during the first republic. The farm settlements, established in the 1960s, promoted modern farming techniques and increased agricultural production. Crops such as oil palm, rubber, citrus fruits, yams, cocoyams, and maize were cultivated, improving food security and generating income for settlers and the regional government. The Israeli model introduced Eastern Nigerians to modern farming practices, enhancing their skills and knowledge. This exposure helped improve crop yields and quality. The settlements provided settlers with access to education, healthcare, and other essential amenities, improving their overall quality of life and also promoted social interactions among the settlers and members of the host communities. The farm settlements contributed to the region's economic growth, with the Eastern Region's economy growing at an impressive rate of over 9.2% between 1962 and 1967 (Adigwe, 1987). The region saw the establishment of various industries, including manufacturing and processing facilities, which helped stimulate economic development.

The primary success of the scheme lay in its revolutionary approach to rural sociology: the professionalization of the African farmer. Before 1962, agriculture was largely seen as a default occupation for the uneducated. By establishing Farm Institutes in places like Igbariam and Achi, the government successfully rebranded farming as a prestigious, technical vocation (Okobi, 1997). The recruitment of "Settlers", literate young men with Standard VI certificates—created a new class of agrarian entrepreneurs. These men were not merely subsistence growers; they were trained in soil science, animal husbandry, and the mechanics of irrigation. This shift successfully stemmed the "rural-urban drift" for a critical half-decade, proving that with the right incentives—modern housing, schools, and health clinics—the educated youth could be anchored to the countryside (Floyd, 1969).

Technologically, the settlements were a triumph of productivity over traditional methods. In settlements like Uzouwani (Adani), the introduction of systematic irrigation and high-yield rice varieties transformed swampy terrain into a "rice bowl" for the region. In Ohaji and Erei, the transition from wild-harvested oil palm to the scientific cultivation of the *Tenera* variety dramatically increased oil extraction rates. These settlements functioned as live laboratories where the "Green Revolution" was not a theoretical concept but a daily reality. The success was visible in the yields; the organized acreage of the settlements consistently outperformed traditional fragmented holdings, providing a blueprint for how Nigeria could achieve food sovereignty through scale and science (Udo, 1970).

Furthermore, the scheme achieved a rare success in fostering inter-communal integration and social engineering. By utilizing a recruitment quota—often split 50/50 between host community members and settlers from distant provinces—the government used the farm settlements as "melting pots." This promoted a sense of regional identity that transcended local village loyalties. The settlements were designed as "Model Villages," featuring piped water and electricity, which raised the standard of living for the entire surrounding district. The infrastructure built for the settlements often



provided the only reliable healthcare and education for miles, serving as a catalyst for broader rural development.

Perhaps the most enduring success of the Israeli-inspired settlements was the establishment of a robust value-chain economy. Unlike previous colonial models that focused solely on extraction, the Okpara administration integrated processing into the farm gates. The presence of oil mills at Erei and rice mills at Adani meant that value was added at the source, increasing the profit margins for the settlers and the regional government. This "industrial-agrarian" nexus created a template for the modern Staple Crop Processing Zones currently being revived across Nigeria today (Adigwe, 1987).

The success of the Eastern Nigeria farm settlements was rooted in its holistic vision. It was a scheme that understood that to grow crops, one must first grow people. It succeeded in proving that the African rainforest could support highly mechanized, cooperative, and profitable modern life. Though the physical infrastructure was largely decimated by the 1967–1970 conflict, the intellectual success of the scheme survives as the high-water mark of Nigerian agricultural planning—a reminder that when science, state will, and youthful energy converge, the earth yields more than just food; it yields progress.

Failures

The Israeli-inspired farm settlement scheme of Eastern Nigeria, while a masterpiece of vision on paper, eventually succumbed to a complex web of structural, economic, and sociopolitical failures. While it is easy to point to the Nigerian Civil War as the sole cause of its demise, the seeds of its decline were sown in its very design and the cultural friction it created.

A primary failure was the "Social Engineering Gap" between the Israeli Moshav model and the indigenous Igbo and Efik social structures. The Moshav required a level of rigid, centralized cooperative discipline that often clashed with the highly individualistic and republican nature of the Eastern Nigerian farmer. Settlers, who were promised the status of modern entrepreneurs, often felt like over-regulated government tenants. The state's heavy-handed control over what crops were planted, how they were marketed, and even the settlers' daily schedules created a stifling environment. This lack of true autonomy led to a psychological "disengagement," where settlers viewed the project as a government job rather than a personal heritage (Nwulu, 1999).

Economically, the scheme suffered from a "Gestation Crisis." The focus on perennial cash crops like oil palm, rubber, and cocoa meant that there was a five-to-seven-year window before the first significant harvest. During this time, the government provided a meager subsistence allowance that was often insufficient to support a growing family. This led to high attrition rates among the most educated settlers, who abandoned the farms for immediate salaried positions in the civil service or urban trade. The financial model assumed a level of patience and state liquidity that was unsustainable in a volatile, post-colonial economy (Floyd and Adinde, 1967).

The "Host Community Friction" was another critical failure point. In the rush to establish large-scale estates, the government often bypassed traditional land tenure systems, using eminent domain to acquire thousands of hectares from local villages. This created a lasting resentment among the original landowners, who felt cheated by the compensation packages. This friction frequently manifested in sabotage, theft of seedlings, or boundary disputes. Because the settlers were often "strangers" brought in from other provinces to fill quotas, they lacked the traditional protection of the local kinship networks, making them vulnerable and socially isolated.



Furthermore, the scheme was plagued by "Technological Alienation." While the introduction of tractors and irrigation was progressive, there was no local industry to support the maintenance of this equipment. When the Israeli consultants departed or when spare parts became unavailable due to foreign exchange shortages, the "modern" farms quickly regressed. The high cost of maintaining an "imported" standard of living—including piped water and electricity in remote areas—drained the regional treasury, making the settlements look like expensive islands of privilege rather than scalable models for the average Nigerian village.

Ultimately, the failure of the settlements was a failure of sustainability. The scheme was a top-down creation of the political elite that relied too heavily on external expertise and state subsidies. When the Civil War broke out, the fragile administrative links dissolved instantly. Unlike traditional village farming, which survived the war through its decentralized resilience, the farm settlements—dependent on centralized mills, state logistics, and government credit—collapsed entirely, leaving behind a legacy of abandoned concrete ruins and unfulfilled promises.

Conclusion

The legacy of the Eastern Nigeria farm settlement scheme serves as a profound paradox in African developmental history: it was simultaneously a visionary blueprint for modernization and a cautionary tale of top-down state planning. To conclude an analysis of this era is to recognize that the scheme did not simply "fail" or "succeed" in a binary sense; rather, it proved that while technical agricultural revolutions are possible, they are only as durable as the social and political soil in which they are planted. The most significant takeaway from the study of the Erei, Ulonna, and Uzouwani settlements is the tension between industrial efficiency and human sustainability. The Israeli Moshav model successfully demonstrated that Nigerian soil could support world-class yields when paired with scientific management. However, it also revealed that agrarian success cannot be imported. The "settler" identity was never fully reconciled with the traditional "landowner" identity, creating a legal and social vacuum that persists to this day in the form of inheritance disputes and host-community tensions.

The farm settlements showed promising results initially, with settlers enjoying improved livelihoods, access to education, and health care. The Israeli farm settlements in Eastern Nigeria, ultimately fell into disrepair due to various challenges. The political instability in Nigeria, unleashed by the January 1966 military intervention in Nigerian politics led to gradual eclipse of this novel farming experiment, successive military governments in the country did not prioritize agricultural production. The military governments abandoned the scheme. The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) marked a significant turning point in Israeli involvement in the farm settlements. During this time, Israel lent assistance to Biafran rebels, which strained relations with the Nigerian government. After the civil war, Nigeria experienced oil boom in the 1970s. As the Nigerian government shifted its focus to oil exports in the 1970s, the farm settlements began to decline, and Israeli involvement decreased accordingly. The settlements were heavily dependent on government support, which dwindled over time. As Nigerian government increasingly shifted its focus to oil exports, agricultural policies and programs became neglected.

Inadequate Funding was another factor that led to the failure of the Israeli Farm Settlements in eastern Nigeria. Insufficient funding and resources hindered the settlements' ability to maintain infrastructure, provide adequate training, and support farmers. Adequate and sustainable funding needed for the long-term viability of farm settlements were not available. The high level corruption among public officials in the country also contributed to the failure of the farm settlements



(Amanze, 2001). The study also identified poor management as another factor that crippled the scheme. Poor management by those who were entrusted with the administration of the settlements inflicted a devastating blow on the Israeli farm settlements scheme in eastern Nigeria. Ineffective management and lack of extension services contributed to the decline of the settlements.

Okobi (1997) has submitted that conflicting land tenure systems and inadequate land registration led to disputes over land ownership and usage. The farm settlements faced significant challenges, including inadequate funding, poor management, and lack of maintenance, leading to their decline and eventual abandonment. Today, many of these farm settlements lie in disrepair, with settlers struggling to access basic amenities like electricity, water, and healthcare.

There have been efforts to revive the farm settlements, including a bill passed by the House of Representatives in 2017 to establish more farm settlements across the country. However, no practical efforts have been made to ensure its actualization. Furthermore, the collapse of these settlements during and after the Nigerian civil war highlights the fragility of centralized agricultural systems. Traditional, decentralized peasant farming survived the conflict because it was rooted in the community; the farm settlements failed because they were dependent on a state apparatus that proved to be mortal. The transition of these estates from "settler-owned cooperatives" to "dilapidated state parastatals" represents a lost opportunity to create a rural middle class, leaving a generation of descendants in a state of legal and economic limbo.

Ultimately, the study of these settlements offers a vital lesson for contemporary African policymakers: modernization must be an evolution, not an imposition. Today's efforts to revive these lands through private-public partnerships, such as the entry of Ellah Lakes and CSS Farms, must avoid the mistakes of the 1960s. Success in the next century will depend not just on the volume of rice or palm oil produced, but on the ability to integrate local communities as true stakeholders, ensuring that the promise of land ownership made sixty years ago is finally fulfilled. The ruins of the original settlements are not just monuments to a failed past, but a fertile foundation for a more inclusive and resilient agricultural future. Agricultural development projects must be tailored to local contexts, considering environmental, social, and cultural factors. Projects should prioritize community engagement and participation to ensure ownership and sustainability. Long-term sustainability should be a primary concern, with a focus on building local capacity and reducing dependence on external expertise. The Israeli farm settlements in Eastern Nigeria achieved notable successes in introducing modern farming techniques and improving crop yields. However, environmental challenges, land and community tensions, and sustainability concerns limited their impact. The experience highlights the complexities of international development cooperation and the need for context-specific, community-driven approaches.

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Authors' contributions

All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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